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DESERTING MOTHERS, ABANDONED BABIES, LOST
FATHERS: DANGERS IN SAFE HAVENS
By Jeffrey A. Parness
I. INTRODUCTION
Safe Haven laws allow genetic mothers to abandon their newborns
with no questions asked. Newborns are then protected from potential
abuse or neglect, and they can be adopted at an early age into a loving
and welcoming family. Mothers are free to go on with their lives
knowing that the best interests of their children have been secured. So
what is wrong? The problem lies with the law's neglect of the genetic
fathers. Seemingly, the parenthood opportunities of men are lost without
anyone asking the genetic fathers if they care. Furthermore, no matter
how much better the children's lives, proper social policy demands that
genetic fathers, who often have both the opportunity for paternity and
childrearing interests, should not be so easily dismissed.
II. EQUALITY IN MATERNITY AND PATERNITY
Earlier American maternity and paternity laws for children born
through old-fashioned pregnancies-that is, through sexual intercourse
between consenting adults-were quite troublesome. There were odd
notions about marriage and the capabilities, rights, and responsibilities
of women and men as parents. Today, we mightily strive toward
developing differing visions of marriage and toward greater equality for
all genetic parents.
Currently, American maternity and paternity laws share certain
traits. Laws for designating both maternity and paternity around the
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time of birth largely originate in American state statutes and are
dependent upon the state of birth. All state statutes on genetic ties and
legal parenthood attempt to promote early, accurate, informed, and
conclusive designations. A 1992 federal study described the importance
of these designations:
Parentage determination does more than provide genealogical clues to a child's
background; it establishes fundamental emotional, social, legal and economic
ties between parent and child. It is a prerequisite to securing financial support
for the child and to developing the heightened emotional support the child
derives from enforceable custody and visitation rights. Parentage
determination also unlocks the door to government-provided dependent's
benefits, inheritance, and an accurate medical history for the child.
Today, maternity and paternity lawmakers generally seek to treat
women and men similarly. Equality is firmly grounded in both the
Federal Constitution and the state constitutions. The U.S. Constitution
mandates, in the Fourteenth Amendment, that "no State ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.",2 Many
states have more expansive constitutional dictates. The Illinois
Constitution not only says that no person shall be denied "the equal
protection of the laws,' 3 but it also expressly condemns equal protection
denials or abridgements "on account of sex by the State or its units of
local government and school districts."4 In another provision, it states
that "all persons shall have the right to be free from discrimination on
the basis . . . of sex in the hiring and promotion practices of any
employer or in the sale or rental of property,"5 thus expressly
recognizing that equality should extend beyond governmental agencies
and officers. These latter mandates are "enforceable without action by
the General Assembly," though the legislature may "establish reasonable
exemptions" and "provide additional remedies.",
6
State legislators are often more explicit about the desired equality
between female and male genetic parents. A Delaware Code provision,
in the statutory title on Domestic Relations, states:
1. U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT, SUPPORTING OUR CHILDREN:
A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 120 (1992).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Ill. CONST. art. I, § 2.
4. Id. at§ 18.
5. Id. at § 17.
6. Id.
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The father and mother are the joint natural guardians of their minor child and
are equally charged with the child's support, care, nurture, welfare and
education. Each has equal powers and duties with respect to such child, and
neither has any right, or presumption of right or fitness, superior to the right of
the other concerning such child's custody or any other matter affecting the
child. If either parent should die, or abandon his or her family, or is incapable,
for any reason, to act as guardian of such child, then, the custody of such child
devolves upon the other parent. Where the parents live apart, the Court may
award the custody of their minor child to either of them and neither shall
benefit from any presumption of being better suited for such award.
7
In parentage laws, however, absolute equality-meaning no
differences whatsoever between women and men-certainly is not, and
should not be, contemplated. Some differences are inevitable with old-
fashioned pregnancies and births.
Differing treatment of the sexes in the governmental processes for
determining adult-child genetic ties on the road to legal parenthood
designations was condoned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nguyen v.
INS:
The first governmental interest to be served is the importance of assuring that a
biological parent-child relationship exists. In the case of the mother, the
relation is verifiable from the birth itself. The mother's status is documented
in most instances by the birth certificate or hospital records and the witnesses
who attest to her having given birth.
In the case of the father, the uncontestable fact is that he need not be present at
the birth. If he is present, furthermore, that circumstance is not
incontrovertible proof of fatherhood . . . . Fathers and mothers are not
similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological parenthood. The
imposition of a different set of rules for making that legal determination with
respect to fathers and mothers is neither surprising nor troublesome from a
constitutional perspective.
The Supreme Court thus sustained differing procedures for
establishing parent-child genetic ties. The high court examined a statute
governing the U.S. citizenship of a child born outside the country to a
U.S. citizen parent and a noncitizen parent who were unmarried. 9 The
statute not only differentiated between married and unmarried parents,
7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 701 (a) (2004).




but also, for unmarried couples, between mothers and fathers.' ° For a
child born to an unwed citizen mother, the child's citizenship arose if the
mother, at the time of birth, had previously been physically present in
the U.S. for a continuous period of one year." For a child born to an
unwed citizen father, the child's citizenship could only arise where "a
blood relationship" was established, and where, before reaching 18 years
of age, the child was "legitimated," legally acknowledged by the father,
or the subject of a paternity court adjudication. 12 The "differential
treatment" of unwed citizen fathers was upheld, as it was "designed to
ensure an acceptable documentation of paternity.' 13 Additional steps in
the documentation of maternity, beyond proof of birth from the mother,
were unnecessary, as proof of motherhood is "inherent in birth itself'
and recognized in a birth certificate, which has "the benefit of
witnesses."'
14
Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed some state
paternity laws to operate where the acceptable documentation of genetic
ties for paternity purposes did not necessarily involve proof of an actual
"blood relationship."' 5 Thus, certain state laws now presume genetic
ties between a man and a child if certain acts are undertaken by the man
before or shortly after birth; many acts, such as marriage to the genetic
mother or holding the child out in the community as his own, do not
assure, or even require, blood relations. Such presumptive dads can
sometimes be displaced by actual genetic fathers, but not always. State
laws can also prompt irrebuttable presumptions of blood relationships
for men having no blood ties. Thus, there can be state laws posing
barriers to actual genetic fathers who seek to override marital
presumptions, even though others, including the presumed fathers,
genetic mothers, or children, may be entitled to rebut the same
presumptions.
Beyond the methods of proof of genetic ties, there is further
inequality between the sexes in parentage laws. For example, there need
not be absolute equality in the availability of parental rights for women
and men, even where both have proven genetic ties. Differing
childrearing interests were sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme Court in
10. Id. at 57-58.
11. Id. at 59-60.
12. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 59.
13. Id. at 63.
14. Id. at 64.
15. Id. at 59.
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Caban v. Mohammed:
Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection
between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring. The
mother carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is
clear. The validity of the father's parental claims must be gauged by other
measures. By tradition, the primary measure has been the legitimate familial
relationship he creates with the child by marriage with the mother .... In
some circumstances the actual relationship between father and child may
suffice to create in the ... father parental interests.
16
The U.S. Supreme Court sustained differing childrearing interests
for unwed citizen mothers and fathers in Nguyen. For an unmarried
father who establishes "a biological parent-child relationship," he must
also agree "in writing to provide financial support" to the child until the
child is eighteen in order to secure U.S. citizenship for the child. 17 This
requirement was said to ensure that there is "the opportunity for a
meaningful relationship" between the citizen father and child, thus
creating a greater likelihood of "real, everyday ties" connecting the
citizen father, the child, and the United States.18 No similar statutory
requirement was appropriate for the unwed citizen mother, as the
"opportunity" for a meaningful relationship between her and the child
inheres "in the very event of birth."'19 Thus, for genetic mothers "real,
everyday ties" sufficient to prompt general childrearing interests can
arise solely from the genetic ties, while for genetic fathers (because they
are less involved in the birthing process) the requisite "real, everyday
ties" may not be demonstrated solely by genes alone and may require
(usually under state law) parental-like conduct.20 Even significant,
16. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979).
17. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 59.
18. Id. at 65.
19. See id. at 65. Besides methods of proving maternity and paternity, there are other
legal procedural differences between unwed genetic mothers and fathers. For example, in
some American states, only genetic fathers may waive any childrearing rights prior to birth in
order to facilitate adoptions. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1106(c) (2004) ("A mother
whose consent to the termination of parental rights is required may execute a consent only
after the child is born. Consent by the father or presumed father may be executed either
before or after the child is born."); NEV. REv. STAT. § 127.070 (2004) ("All ... consents to
adoption executed ... by the mother before the birth of a child or within 72 hours after the
birth.., are invalid .... A... consent to adoption may be executed by the father before the
birth... if the father is not married to the mother."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-604 (2005) (a
man can "consent to an adoption before or after the child is born," but a mother may consent
"at any time after the child is born but not sooner").
20. The nature of the necessary non-genetic ties under state laws often vary even within
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actual parenting before and at the time of birth still may not result in
childrearing interests for unwed genetic fathers; in some states, where
children are born by women married to other men and their marriages
are intact, there exist paternity presumptions founded on marriage.2'
These differences between genetic mothers and genetic fathers
effectively mean that at or shortly after birth, almost all children born in
the United States as a result of consensual sexual intercourse between
adults will have, at least initially, legal mothers who are genetically tied,
but they may not have their genetic fathers legally recognized as parents.
For legal parenthood, the genetic fathers may need to establish
"relationships more enduring," as by marriage to the mothers, paternity
acknowledgments, affidavits and the like, or actual parenting. In fact, a
man with no genetic ties to a newborn may be recognized as the initial
legal father of that newborn; this can occur where there are paternity
presumptions based on marriage.22
Because biological connections alone are often insufficient to
prompt "full-blown" parental rights for genetic fathers around the time
of birth, the legal techniques available to these fathers to establish
parent-child relationships that prompt parental rights must be reasonable.
Thus, in Lehr v. Robertson, the U.S. Supreme Court validated state
adoption procedures that granted all unwed genetic mothers, but not all
unwed genetic fathers, "the right to veto an adoption and the right to
prior notice of any adoption proceeding. 23 For genetic fathers, there
would also be the need to show "custodial, personal or financial"
relationships with the children in order to secure participation rights.24
The court observed, however, that the statutory schemes for such
a single state, depending upon the purpose for which the legal paternity is designated. Thus,
legal fatherhood at the time of birth may depend upon genetic ties alone, as in child support
settings, or may require, in addition, actual "real, every day [or at least regular] ties," as in
notice and participation rights in adoption settings. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65 (referring to
"real, everyday regular ties").
21. See, e.g., Strausser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1055-56 (Pa. 1999) (holding that there
is an irrebuttable paternity presumption founded upon marriage provided that: the marriage is
intact; there was an intact family at all times; and the married couple favors maintaining the
presumption). Even where the paternity presumption is rebuttable, the genetic father may
have no standing to seek to rebut, even in situations where he hopes to establish a parent-child
relationship recognized under law, and where he, in some ways, has already parented his
genetic offspring. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989).
22. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(1) (1999) ("A man is presumed to be the
natural father of a child if ... he and the child's natural mother are or have been married to
each other. .. and the child is born or conceived during such marriage.").
23. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 (1983).
24. Id. at 262.
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showings were unlikely to "omit many responsible fathers" or to estop
many fathers who failed to make the required showings for reasons
beyond their control.25
Though there cannot be absolute equality in parental matters
involving genetic mothers and genetic fathers, recently there has been a
more vigorous pursuit of greater equality. Efforts involving
nondiscrimination between the genetic parents of children born as a
result of consensual sexual intercourse have been spurred by U.S.
Supreme Court admonitions that equal treatment is usually preferred,
whether or not parenthood was welcomed by one or each of the
intercoursing couple. Lawmakers have also pursued equality between
many wed and unwed genetic parents.
In 1972, in a situation where parenthood was not welcomed, there
was a felony conviction for "handing over" vaginal foam to an
unmarried woman seeking to prevent pregnancy under a statute which
only allowed a married women access to vaginal foam.26 In striking
down the law, the Court, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, found that the "effect of
the ban on distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons has at best
a marginal relation to the proffered objective" of discouraging premarital
sexual intercourse.27 It held that "if the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.,
28
Thus, the Court recognized that there was at least some equality in the
privacy interests of married couples, a married person, unmarried
couples, and an unmarried person in decisions regarding whether or not
to have children.
Shortly after Eisenstadt, the U.S. Supreme Court explored the
decisional interests of individuals and couples wishing to have children.
In the 1972 case of Stanley v. Illinois, the Court found that significant
social changes justified the expansion of the parental rights normally
accorded marital families to nonmarital families. 29 In that case, a genetic
father challenged the automatic termination of his parental rights of his
three children upon the death of the genetic mother, with whom he had
25. Id. at 264.
26. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
27. Id. at 448.
28. Id. at 453.
29. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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lived on and off for eighteen years. 30 The children had become wards of
the state upon their mother's death because a state statute deemed the
children to have "no surviving parent or guardian., 31 The father did not
receive a hearing on his fitness as a parent before losing custody;32 he
was presumed unfit because he had never been married to the mother.33
On appeal, the father urged that there was an equal protection violation
because he was denied the fitness hearing afforded men who were
married.34 After recognizing that the unwed father had a "cognizable
and substantial" interest in the custody and upbringing of the children,
the Court found equal protection infringements.35 In doing so, the Court
placed unwed natural fathers on the same plane as other natural parents;
in Stanley, the father had been involved significantly in his children's
lives over a long period of time, being both a genetic father and a social
father.36 Because he was a father within a family in every sense but
formal marriage, the Court did not say whether his rights could have
stemmed exclusively from his genetic ties, his relationships with his
children, his quasi-marriage to their mother, or the mere presence, for an
extended period of time, of an existing, though nontraditional, "family
unit."
Caban v. Mohammed37 was another equality case wherein
parenthood was welcomed. In Caban, the Court found that an adoption
statute exemplified "overbroad generalizations" in gender-based
classifications.38 The genetic father, Abdiel Caban, tried to block the
adoption of his two children.39 He was identified as the father on each
child's birth certificate and had lived with the children and their genetic
mother for two years.40  He continued to see his children after their
mother left him and married another man.4 The mother's new husband
petitioned to adopt, prompting Caban and his new wife to do the same.42
Under a New York statute that allowed an unwed mother, but not an
30. Id. at 649.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 646.
33. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647.
34. Id. at 646.
35. Id. at 652-53.
36. Id. at 646.
37. 441 U.S. 380(1979).
38. Id. at 394.
39. Id. at 381-82.
40. Id. at 382.
41. Caban, 441 U.S at 382.
42. Id. at 383.
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unwed father, to block an adoption simply by withholding consent, the
trial court severed Caban's parental rights and granted the stepfather's
adoption request.4 3 The Supreme Court concluded that the statute
created an unacceptable gender-based classification. 4 Specifically, the
Court said that the distinction "invariably" made between unwed genetic
mothers and fathers was not "substantially related to" the purported state
interest of facilitating the adoption of illegitimate children.45  The
holding was limited, however, to cases where there was not a newborn
adoption;46 where the identity of the unwed genetic father was
established early;47 and where that genetic father had manifested "a
significant paternal interest in the child, 48 meaning that he had
"established a substantial relationship with the child" 49 that had
continued for some time. As for adoptions of newborns, the Court
expressed "no view" on whether distinctions between unwed mothers
and unwed fathers might pass muster.50
At times, legal distinctions between maternity and paternity are
analyzed in terms of fundamental rights, rather than in terms of equality.
Thus, lawmakers sometimes speak about the differing liberty interests in
childrearing for genetic mothers and genetic fathers. The interface
between equality and liberty presents challenges not only in parentage
settings, but also in other settings, such as interracial marriages and
homosexual acts. Lawmakers can speak to the privacy interests of only
certain women and men (i.e., heterosexuals) in weddings and in sexual
activities without mentioning the interests of others (i.e., homosexuals)
as easily as they can speak to inequalities between two people. Thus,
maternity and paternity laws, like marriage and sexual conduct laws, can
be written to reflect differing rights for differing people founded on their
varied claims to constitutionally-protected "liberty," rather than to
reflect rationales relating to gender (or other forms of) discrimination.
With regard to equality and liberty in the context of gay and lesbian
sexual conduct, Justice Kennedy, in Lawrence v. Texas,51 noted:
43. Id. at 383-84.
44. Id. at 394.
45. Caban, 441 U.S. at 382.
46. Id. at 392.
47. Id. at 394.
48. Id. at 394.
49. Caban, 441 U.S. at 393.
50. Id. at 393 n. 11. As noted below, more recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions suggest
that many distinctions between mothers and fathers in newborn adoptions are invalid.
51. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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"Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for
conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in
important respects., 52 Of course, under U.S. Supreme Court precedents,
while maternity and paternity distinctions founded on the varied liberty
interests of genetic mothers and genetic fathers cannot perpetuate
ancient norms that are no longer justified, they can respect, at least to
some degree, "pedigree" and "traditional" notions of justice.
53
III. DESERTION, ABANDONMENT AND LOSS
The pursuit of greater, and perhaps even constitutionally-
compelled, equality between genetic mothers and genetic fathers
continues. Unfortunately, equality principles have generally been
ignored in constructing and implementing state statutes on the voluntary
abandonment of newborns. If equality principles were applied, many of
these laws would fail.
Though written in gender-neutral terms, many American states now
effectively permit the abandonment of newborns to be undertaken solely
by genetic mothers. These acts usually foreclose, without notice or a
chance to be heard, any legal parenthood for genetic fathers who are fit
and willing to parent and who may even have attained federal
constitutional childrearing interests, as through, for example, marital
presumptions. Genetic mothers can walk away from parental
responsibilities early on in a child's life, whereas comparable desertions
are usually forbidden for genetic fathers in cases where the genetic
mothers maintain custody,54 as well as for genetic mothers once their
children are a little older.
52. Id. at 575.
53. Burnham v. California, 495 U.S. 604, 621-22 (1990).
54. See, e.g., N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a genetic
father's "child support obligations occur without regard" to his "wishes or his emotional
attachment to his offspring"; here, a man could not "escape" responsibility even though he
alleged that the mother "fraudulently induced sexual intercourse (by lying about her use of
birth control) and "then left the state, married another man, and delayed seeking child support
for several years after birth."); In re T.M.C., 52 P.3d 934 (Nev. 2002) (finding that there is no
termination of financial responsibilities for genetic father where the child was a teenager and
the father long ago had abandoned her; the child's best interests are thus served because she
might later benefit from financial aid, including her father's reimbursement, of a state welfare
agency for money it had provided).
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Enabling statutory provisions, chiefly enacted in the last decade
following the 1999 "Baby Moses" law in Texas, 55 are frequently deemed
"Safe Haven" (or "Safe Haven Infant Protection") laws. They typically
are justified on child protection grounds. They often guarantee the
caretakers of certain newborns both anonymity and immunity from
prosecution for child abandonment. Safe Haven laws do vary widely
from state to state. They differ on such issues as which children may be
left (i.e., younger than three or thirty days? abused children?), where
children may be left (i.e., hospitals only, or also at police or fire
stations?), who may leave children (i.e., genetic parent only, or any
person with lawful custody?), and the procedures for accepting children
(i.e., anonymity always, or may questions be asked by the recipients?).
While there is much variation, most Safe Haven provisions
effectively permit abandonment of very young children by genetic
mothers without requiring the mothers to reveal much, if anything, about
the genetic fathers. These lost fathers need not be alleged rapists,
unwilling parents, or bad parents for the Safe Haven laws to operate.
They can be married men with genetic ties and positive feelings about
fatherhood. In most instances, the identities of genetic fathers will be
undiscoverable later, as in adoption proceedings. For example, a
Wisconsin statute says that when a genetic mother relinquishes child
custody and there is no evidence of abuse or neglect, no person "may
induce or coerce or attempt to induce or coerce a parent ... who wishes
to remain anonymous into revealing ... her identity., 56 Less restrictive
is a West Virginia statute which declares that a hospital taking
possession of an abandoned child from a parent "may not require" the
parent to identify himself or herself and shall "respect the person's
desire to remain anonymous. 57 A New Mexico statute is even more
sympathetic to lost fathers, but ultimately provides little practical help,
as it states: "A hospital may ask the person leaving the infant for the
name of the infant's biological father[,] ... the infant's name and the
infant's medical history, but the person leaving the infant is not required
to provide that information to the hospital. 5 8  And in South Carolina,
the statute states that a receiving hospital "must ask the person leaving
the infant" for similar medical information, as indicated on a form
55. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.301 (Vernon 2004).
56. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.195 (West 2003).
57. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6E-1 (Michie 2004).
58. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-22-3 (Michie 2004).
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provided by the Department of Social Services.59 Yet, the South
Carolina law also notes that the person leaving the infant "is not required
to disclose his or her identity. 6 °
A few Safe Haven laws initially appear quite sympathetic to lost
fathers. In Florida, the statutory procedures regarding women who
abandon newborns reasonably believed to be less than four days old
include requirements on diligent searches for, and notices to, lost
fathers. 61 They also grant to lost fathers opportunities to void earlier
parental rights terminations or adoptions within one year if a court finds
"that a person knowingly gave false information that prevented the birth
parent from timely making known his or her desire to assume parental
responsibilities toward the minor or from exercising his or her parental
rights." 62 However, there is also a Florida Safe Haven provision which
states that, except "where there is actual or suspected child abuse or
neglect, any parent who leaves a newborn infant ... and expresses an
intent to leave . . .and not return, has the absolute right to remain
anonymous and to leave at any time" and to "not be pursued or
followed., 63 Thus, Florida law often provides no practical opportunities
for diligent searches so that genetic fathers of very young newborns are
not lost. When genetic mothers place for adoption children who are four
days old, the proceedings to terminate all parental rights in anticipation
of later adoptions require judicial inquiries and, perhaps, adoption entity
searches for the fathers. These fathers include men who were or are
married to the mothers, men declared by courts to be fathers or adopted
fathers, men who acknowledged or claimed paternity, and men who
cohabitated with the mothers at the times of conception.
64
So what's wrong with Safe Haven laws, especially those
recognizing newborn abandonment opportunities for all custodial
parents?65 Do they not promote child protection by allowing at-risk
children to be placed in safety easily? While some children might be
saved from abuse or neglect, or adopted quickly into loving families,
thereby escaping much despair while growing up, Safe Haven laws also
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85 (Law. Co-op. 2004).
60. Id.
61. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0423(4) (West 2004).
62. Id. at § 63.0423(9)(a).
63. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 383.50(5) (West 2004).
64. See id. at § 63.088(4)-(5).
65. There are further issues raised by Safe Haven laws (e.g., how the requisites
regarding the infant's age or the custodial status are verified) that are not discussed herein, as
they are unrelated to "lost fathers."
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promote the social norm 66 that women can comparably terminate the
actual or potential childrearing interests of men both before and after
birth. Yet, notwithstanding their pre-birth abortion rights under Roe v.
Wade,67 women have never generally possessed veto powers over the
childrearing interests of genetic fathers of children born alive, at least
where the women are unwed genetic mothers whose pregnancies
resulted from consensual sexual intercourse. Such maternal powers are
"foreign to our legal tradition. 68 They have no "pedigree" and do not
promote "traditional" notions of justice.69 The result of a Safe Haven
maternal desertion and child abandonment is the loss of a father for the
child. It effectively forecloses the benefits, but not necessarily the
financial obligations, of paternity, even for a man who, both prebirth
70
and postbirth,71 established an "actual" parent-child relationship72 or was
subject to a marital paternity presumption.73 Imagine a reversal of usual
roles. What would hospital, police, or fire personnel likely do if a man,
as a parent, sought to abandon a newborn and to walk away with no
questions asked?
When mothers seek financial assistance for their children from the
government, they have duties to help the state undertake diligent
searches for genetic fathers so that the men can reimburse the
government for any monetary aid rendered.74 Comparably, genetic
mothers wishing to desert their children should be required to cooperate
in good faith in establishing paternity so that genetic fathers, assuming
66. See, e.g., Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging
Divorced Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 921 (2005) (showing how family laws on
child custody have influenced social norms).
67. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
68. N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6thCir. 2004).
69. Burnham v. California, 495 U.S. 604, 621-22 (1990).
70. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 383-94 (1979) (Some state laws recognize
that parental interests for genetic fathers in adoption proceedings may be established prior to
birth, as through rendering financial assistance to expectant mothers during their pregnancies,
or though registering in a putative father registry).
71. See id. (Some state laws recognize that parental interests for genetic fathers in
adoption proceedings may be established after birth, even without maternal knowledge or
approval, as through registering in a putative father registry).
72. See id. (Some state laws recognize that parental interests for genetic fathers in
adoption proceedings may arise upon proof of actual parenting).
73. See id. (Some state laws recognize that parental interests for men in adoption
proceedings may arise, even without maternal knowledge or approval, as through a marital
paternity presumption founded on marriage to the genetic mother at the time of conception or
for some time during the pregnancy, even if not at the time of birth).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 654(29)(a) (2005).
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that there was no earlier loss or lack of paternity (as due to rape), may be
asked whether they, too, wish to desert. It is unfair to require judicial
inquiries and diligent searches for certain genetic fathers and presumed
fathers only when children placed for adoption by their genetic mothers
are older than three or thirty days and thus outside the Safe Haven
laws. 5  And, under Lehr, state adoption schemes can neither likely
"omit many responsible fathers ' 76 nor estop many genetic fathers who
failed to establish, under Caban, "enduring" parent-child relationships
77
for reasons beyond their control.78
IV. CONCLUSION
While a genetic mother having child custody may employ Safe
Haven laws to escape parental responsibilities, genetic fathers without
custody typically may not walk away in the same fashion. They cannot
escape child support obligations, even if they never attained childrearing
rights. They cannot desert their genetic offspring, even if they were
fooled into conception and were forgotten (or avoided) during the
pregnancy and at the birth.
Safe Haven laws infringe upon the paternity opportunity and the
childrearing interests of many genetic fathers. The governmental action
that infringes on these interests is found in the systematic disregard of
"many responsible fathers ' 79 who could be safeguarded without undue
infringements on the privacy interests of genetic mothers, without
undermining their children's best interests, and without diminishing the
existing legal doctrine on access to abortion services.8°
75. In a few areas, Safe Haven provisions cover children who are forty-five days old or
younger; see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-15,100 (2001), or ninety days old or younger; see,
e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-22-2(c) (Michie 2004). In North Dakota, the child need only be
less than a year old. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-02, 50-25.1-15 (2004).
76. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264 (1983).
77. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979).
78. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264.
79. Id. at 264-65 (suggesting that a state adoption process found to omit many
responsible fathers would be unconstitutional).
80. This paper does not argue that the noted failures in the Safe Haven laws render all
such laws invalid under the Federal Constitution or the state constitutions because they unduly
burden exercises of fatherhood opportunity interests or other parental rights of unwed genetic
fathers. It concedes that such analyses may be difficult under Lehr. See, e.g., Heidbreder v.
Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355, 374 n.13 (Minn. 2002). Rather, this paper finds that constitutional
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rights analyses are unnecessary to effectuate legal change affording fairer treatment to unwed
genetic fathers in maternal desertion settings because reform is supported by legitimate social
policies. There is precedent, however, for such constitutional rights. See, e.g., Friehe v.
Schad, 545 N.W.2d 740, 836 (Neb. 1996) (procedural due process protects "liberty" interest
of "a putative father to potentially form a familial bond with his child," though this interest is
less protected than the liberty interest in "established custodial rights" or in the "upbringing of
children"); In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459, 462 (Ga. 1987) ("unwed fathers gain from
their biological connection with a child an opportunity interest ... which is constitutionally
protected."); and In re Baby Boy W., 988 P.2d 1270, 1272-1274 (Okla, 1999) (procedural due
process claim recognized in private adoption involving an unwed genetic father's right to
"notice" of child's birth and chance to grasp "parental opportunity interest" in child).
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